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The Costs of Preventive Detention
Under the spur of "law and order," Congress may soon move de-
cisively in an attempt to protect society against the hardened criminal
who commits crime while on bail.' Alarming rates of pretrial recidi-
vism have recently been documented.2 Courts cannot constitutionally
detain defendants on the basis of dangerousness,3 and the traditional
sub rosa method-through imposing high bail-has been steadily crit-
icized by bail reformers. 4 Proponents of preventive detention believe
we must legitimize detention of the likely recidivist.
The purpose of this Note is to identify the administrative costs of
ensuring that a system of preventive detention in the federal courts
meets the requirements of due process. To protect the rights of the
defendant fully, Congress may have to construct a system so cumber-
some, expensive and open to abuse that preventive detention is less
attractive than other means of preventing pretrial recidivism.
For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the Eighth Amend-
ment is not an obstacle to preventive detention; that is, Congress has
power to deny bail to classes of defendants other than those charged
with capital offenses., The only constitutional hurdle faced by pre-
1. Fourteen bills have been introduced in Congress to change Title 18, United States
Code, to allow 'preventive detention." S. 289, S. 546, S. 2600, & S. 2920, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969); H.R. 323, H.R. 335, H.R. 2781, H.R. 4189, H.R. 5168, H.R. 5213, H.R. 5861,
H.R. 6253, H.R. 12806, & H.R. 15023, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Two other bills, S. 3034
and H.R. 14334, would provide preventive detention in the District of Columbia only.
2. See Hearings on Amendments to the Bail Reform Act of 1966 Before the Subcon-
mittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 91st Cong., 1st Sem,
585-675, 696-98 (1969) [hereinafter cited as HEARINGS]. See also note 9 infra.
3. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659
(Butler, Circuit justice, 1926). See also Reynolds v. United States, 80 S. Ct. 30, 32., 4 L,
Ed. 2d 46, 48 (Douglas, Circuit justice, 1959): "The purpose of bail is to insure thle dle-
fendant's appearance and submission to the judgment of the Court. It is never denied
for the purpose of punishment."
4. See D. FRaEI & P. M. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNrm STATES: 1964 (1964); RaroRT oF rIM
Par.sIEtcr's CoaraussxoN ON CRIME IN THE Disrarar OF COLUMBIA (1966); Boteln, The Man-
hattan Bail Project: Its Impact on Criminology and the Criminal Law Processes, 43 I'uX.
L. REv. 319 (1965); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I & 11, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 959, 1125 (1965); Paulsen, Pre-trial Release in the United States, 66 COLUt. L. Rv.
109 (1966); Note, Bail Reform in the State and Federal Systems, 20 VAND. L. Rnv. 918
(1967); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia,
102 U. PA. L. Rv. 1031 (1954).
5. Most discussions of preventive detention have concentrated on the question of
whether, even with safeguards against abuse, such a scheme would pass constitutilonli
objections. Some observers have felt that the prohibition against excessive bdil In tile
Eighth Amendment is a backhanded guarantee of the right to bail in non-capital cases.
See, e.g., Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I &i 11, 113 U. PA. L. REy. 959,
1125 (1965); Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1966);
Note, Preventive Detention, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 178 (1967).
The arguments supporting an absolute right to bail in non.capital offenses are based
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ventive detention6 is the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which "demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and sub-
stantial relation to the object sought to be attained." 7 The variegated
history of the due process clause shows that notions of reasonableness
shift widely. But where personal liberty is at stake, as in the case of'
preventive detention, courts consistently demand great protection for
the rights of the individual; statutes may not be overly vague, and the
means selected to accomplish the state's object may not be unneces-
sarily restrictive of the individual's freedom.8 These ill-defined but
mainly on favorable dicta, as in Stack v. Boyle: "Unless this right to bail before trial is
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, -would
lose its meaning." 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). The historical basis for such an ab'olute right
rests in the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789, now continued in Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, Rule 46 (a)(1), that persons arrested for non-capital offenes shall be
admitted to bail. But since most crimes of violence and robber), were capital offenses in
1789, Congress was in fact providing a right to bail only for relatively minor offenses.
According to Sen. Robert C. Byrd. English law during this same period listed more than
240 offenses punishable by death. CoNG. REc. S. 1252, Feb. 4, 1969. And although Carlson
v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), may be distinguished on the basis that it was a civil action,
the Court there dearly implied that the excessive bail clause does not confer an absolute
right to bail in criminal prosecutions. So Justice Black's complaint voiced in Carlson v.
Landon is probably right, that "the Amendment does no more than protect a right to
bail which Congress can grant and which Congress can take away." 342 U.S. 524, 557
(dissenting opinion).
6. In most states, a scheme of preventive detention would face specific state constitu-
tional guarantees of the right to bail in non-capital cases; constitutional amendments
would be necessary in these states before legislation authorizing preventive detention
would be possible. This Note will deal only with preventive detention in the federal
system.
7. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934). Although the Supreme Court in
recent decades has been reluctant to invalidate statutes through invocation of "substantive
due process," a coherent argument may be made under this doctrine that preventive
detention is illegal. The fact that only a small segment of ite defendant population is
demonstrably dangerous, and the uncertainty of predicting recidivism, may persuade the
Court that preventive detention would violate substantive due process. See notes 9 & 11
infta. The imprecision of prediction in relation to the small percentage of defendants who
are "dangerous" may suggest that the law is "unreasonable," especially if the offense
categories which will render detention possible are not restricted to those showing high
recidivism rates. See pp. 928-33 infra. Or the lack of predictability in itelf may suggest
that the "means selected" for detention have no real and substantial relation to the object
sought; that is, if recidivism cannot be adequately predicted, the madtinery of preientive
detention may be inadequately related to its goal, the elimination of a major threat to
the safety of the community. But the historical development of procedural due process in
regulating criminal law, and the reluctance of the Court to tamper with the goals of the
police power which this development mirrors, suggest that the substantive due process
question would be answered in favor of preventive detention; the problem of whether
the means chosen are insufficiently related to the end would probably be dealt with under
the auspices of procedural due process. Hence this Note will emphasize primarily the
constitutional problems of preventive detention under lthe guarantee of procedural due
process.
8. "[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, tiat pur-
pose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when
the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). In recent decades the Supreme Court's inspection of
legislatively selected means, in light of alternative, less restrictive metiods, has been most
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fundamental principles inform the history of due process adjudica-
tion where the police power demands restrictions on personal rights.
I. Standards for Detention
Preventive detention is aimed at only a small segment of the de-
fendant population.9 It would certainly be unreasonable to allow
vigorous in first amendment disputes. "[Al governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP
v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
But the range of the Court's use of the least restrictive means rule extends beyond the
first amendment. The criteria enunciated in Shelton v. Tucker were explicitly applied to a
Congressional attempt to restrict the right of Communists to travel in Aptheker v Secre-
tary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964): "The Constitution requires that the powers of
government 'must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to in-
fringe' a constitutionally protected freedom. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
304 (1940)." The Court in Aptheker emphasized that "precision must be the touchstone
of legislation so affecting basic freedoms," 378 U.S. at 514, citing NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
Thus whether or not any constitutional rights occupy a doctrinally "preferred position,"
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1988), it is clear that the
Supreme Court, in practice, gives special weight to certain fundamental freedoms, legis-
lative restrictions on these rights come under special scrutiny. This stringent standard has
precedential roots extending to Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894): the due process
clause, the Court said, requires that the means employed be "reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Id.
at 137. See also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 866 (1915) (a more stringent standard
is to be applied "on a subject like the one under consideration involving the establish-
ment of a right [voting] whose exercise lies at the very basis of government .... );
United States ex. rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955), citing Anderson v. Dunn,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821). See generally M. D. FoRxoscH, CoNSTrrrUT0NAL LAW
892 (1963); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 TAAn L,
REv. 254 (1964).
9. A detailed study of the problem is the 1966 survey of the District of Columbia Ball
Project, which covered a period of two years, 1964-1966, and about 5,000 defendants. This
survey showed a 9.2 per cent re-arrest rate for released defendants, who were charged with
committing crimes during the release period. R. R. MOLLEUR AND STAFF OF TIlE D. C.
BAIL PROJEar, BAIL REFOtr IN THE NATION'S CAPTAL 44 (1966). A subsequent District of
Columbia study showed similar results. Report of the Judicial Council Committee to
Study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the District of Columbia, HEARINGS, Spra
note 2, at 507, Appendix C, 551, 556. Since the Bail Reform Act was instituted, the rate
of pretrial release has risen from about 58 per cent to 75 per cent of bailable defeldants:
thus more defendants are now at liberty pending trial. Statement of Mrs. Patricia M.
Wald, HEArNGs, supra note 2, at 138.
But these statistics may be misleading in at least three ways. First, the figures cannot
reflect undetected crime; for the professional criminal the gap between number of arrests
and number of crimes committed may be substantial. Second, and also tending to suggest
a greater potential danger, the effective detention of large numbers of defendants through
high money bail must prevent a certain amount of pretrial recidivism. Howvever, as long
as the present practice of money bail continues, the effect of this detention will continue;
preventive detention is not necessary to eliminate these defendants' opportunities to
commit crimes.
But it is also very likely that the statistical rates of the surveys give an inflated picture
of pretrial recidivism. Chief Judge Harold H. Greene has analyzed this aspect of the
statistical picture admirably. The 1966 survey by the District of Columbia Crime Commis-
sion showed 207 persons (or 7.5%) charged with committing a new crime while on bail;
but of these, only 124 (4.5%) were charged with a crime or actual or potential violence,
the sort of pretrial crime which the more responsible of the preventive detention measures
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judicial officers to eliminate pretrial recidivism by detaining virtually
every defendant;' 0 hence restraints on judicial discretion are necessary.
If preventive detention is not prohibited on the ground that predic-
tion of recidivism is too uncertain," due process at least demands a
limit upon the offense categories for which detention is possible, and a
minimal showing that the previous behavior of a particular defendant
suggests likely recidivism.' The degree of danger to the community
ought to be substantial and the probability of recidivism ought to be
high in view of the grave consequences of a detention order.
Degree of Danger. The danger which a potential recidivist poses
to society is measured first by the type of crime he is likely to commit.
If the degree of danger is small, because only a minor crime is foreseen,
the interest of society in detaining the defendant would be outveighed
by the cost and burden of detention; and due process is a bar to deten-
tion in such de minimis cases.' 3 For this reason, most commentators
have agreed that preventive detention is permissible only where the
crime anticipated is a serious felony or a crime of violence.'
4
The crime at issue, from the point of view of protecting society, is
the offense expected to be committed upon release. But the crime
which triggers the detention decision is the immediate charge against
the defendant. If defendants with similar serious recidivist histories
are charged with jaywalking and rape, respectively, only the defendant
seek to deter. In addition, "[tihe conviction rate in the District Court is approximately
75 per cent; so that in actuality only about 3 per cent of all those released on bail during
the survey period were found to have committed a violent crime while out on bail."
Statement of Chief Judge Harold H. Greene, District of Columbia Court of General
Sessions, HE-ANGS, supra note 2, at 35.
10. See, e.g., Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra note 6, at 15007; Foote,
supra note 6, at 1167-69.
11. See Dershowitz, Preventing "Preventive Detention," The New York Review of
Books, 18, 22 (farch 13, 1969).
12. See Report of the Judicial Council Committee to Study the Operation of the Bail
Reform Act in the District of Columbia, HrAmNrs, supra note 2, at 554.
The uncertainties implicit in such a broad concept as "due process," especially when
applied to a proposition novel both in theory and practice, are immense; and a court
favorably disposed toward the concept of preventive detention easily might feel that a
simple direction to the court to consider a defendants dangerousness is sulficient pro-
tection. Most commentators, however, have felt that the decision to detain ought to be
to some degree formally limited to defendants whose past behavior indicates probable
recidivism; and this consensus that formal safeguards are necessary includes even those
writers most persuaded that dangerous defendants must be detained. See, e.g., Goldfarb,
A Brief for Preventive Detention, The New York Times, March 1, 1970, § 6 (Magazine)
at 28.
13. Cf. Sas v. Maryland, 534 F.2d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 1964).
14. See, e.g., Statement of Harry L. Subin, Associate Director of the Vera Institute of
Justice, HEARINGs, supra note 2, at 231; Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra
note 5, at 1505.
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charged with the crime of violence ought to be eligible for preventive
detention; to allow detention in the jaywalking case is to invite the
police to harass exconvicts with fabricated charges for minor offenses.
The defendant charged with rape might argue that to base deten-
tion on his present offense category, an unproven charge, is to violate
due process by contradicting the presumption of his innocence. 1 But
once dangerousness is admitted as a consideration in pretrial disposi-
tion, 6 preventive detention is analogous to detention of a defendant
charged with a capital offense; while the actual determination of
dangerousness is made on the basis of the defendant's history, the pos-
sibility of detention is limited to those charged with serious crimes.
The extent to which the presumption of "innocence" is violated is no
greater than in the detention of a defendant charged with a capital
offense.17  Most congressional proposals simply direct the judicial
officer to measure dangerousness under the broad guidelines of the
Bail Reform Act.18 Detention could be ordered for a person charged
15. Compare note 5 supra.
16. Several of the measures before Congress in fact ask no more than that danger to
the community be considered in setting the conditions of pretrial release under the Ball
Reform Act. See, e.g., S. 288, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 1033, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969). Detention would not be allowed; but a dangerous defendant would be subject to
stringent release conditions, even though he were able to establish that his risk of flight
would be minimal. In such a case, of course, the court may now use the arsenal of release
conditions vigorously, under the guise of preventing flight. But such a use of release
conditions is no more than a subtle variation of the sub rosa practice of detention through
high, but not "excessive," money bail. The aim of these measures is to stop tle pretense
and allow courts explicitly to impose strict release conditions on dangerous defendants,
As an analogy to the consideration of dangerousness in setting conditions for release,
the seldom used "peace bond" is often cited. See, e.g., Note, "Preventitie jusliee"-Bollds
to Keep the Peace and for Good Behavior, 88 U. PA. L. Rpm. 331 (1940), The peace bond
provides a convenient, if obscure, device for bridging the gap between the theory that
pretrial release systems can only consider risk of flight and the theory that dangerousness
to the community can also be considered. Courts are allowed to require suspect persons,
such as "outside agitators" in civil rights movements, to post such a bond to emure their
"good behavior;" if the persons cannot post the bond, they are jailed. This power may be
interpreted to support the theory that the purpose of systems of pretrial release may be
determined, within the limits of due process, by the legislature.
17. The detention of defendants charged -with capital offenses is based solely on the
present charge; even though no trial has taken place, the presumption of a defendant's
innocence does not prohibit detention. To this extent, detention pending a capital trial
is "anticipatory." Preventive detention would be limited by the present offense category
with which the defendant is charged, just as detention without bail for risk of flight has
been limited by statute to capital offenses. But in addition to the present charge, pre-
ventive detention would require an "historical" component, based on the defendats
past criminal behavior.
18. See, e.g., H.R. 323, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); H.R. 335, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969);
H.R. 2781, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). "In determining which conditions of release will
reasonably assure appearance, the judicial officer shall, on the basis of available lnforina.
tion, take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, thle weight
of the evidence against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial re-
sources, character ad mental condition, the length of his residence in the community,
his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight
to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings." 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b).
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with even the most minor offense, so long as he appeared dangerous to
the magistrate. This lack of standards is unreasonable. Only those
proposals which limit detention to defendants charged with specific
dangerous crimes, in particular narcotics offenses or crimes of vi-
olence,19 are sufficiently restrictive of judicial discretion to assure
conformity with the requirements of due process.
Probability of Recidivism. Even if the feared recidivist offense is
quite serious, detention is not justified unless it can be shown that
there is a high probability that the defendant will commit the offense
if released. The most objective index of this probability is a "history
of habitual or compulsive lawbreaking while on bail or parole."20
Under this standard, few potential recidivists would be detained.-2
Since a history of convictions for serious crimes suggests a probability
of dangerous recidivism, even if the crimes were not committed on
bail, it appears that due process would require no more than such a
history to establish the requisite probability.22
19. Rep. Miler's bill (H.R. 4189) limits detention orders to cases where ti defendant
is charged with a crime of violence or a crime involving narcotics. H.R. 4189, 91st Cong..
1st Sess. (1969). Sen. Tydings' proposal requires a felony involving bodily violence, armed
robbery or offenses under Chapter 103. . 546, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). An explicit list
of crimes of violence is found in Sen. Byrd's bill, S. 289, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); this
degree of specificity would at least allow no mistake in the type of crime for which an
accused person might be detained. A "crime of violence," as defined by Sen. Byrd's bill,
includes "voluntary manslaughter, murder, rape, mayhem, kidnaping, robbery, burglary.
housebreaking, extortion accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault with intent to commit any felony, arson punishable as a felony, or an
attempt to commit any of the foregoing." Narcotics offenses, even though they may,
standing alone, indicate insignificant danger to the community, are seen as a special
problem area. These offenses show a particularly high rate of recidivism; and the high
cost of addiction maintenance forces most addicts to commit repeated burglaries and
robberies. See Statement of Hon. Charles IV. Halleck, Judge of the District of Columbia
Court of General Sessions, HEAMNGS, supra note 2, at 91, 121; Report of the Judicial
Council Committee to Study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the District of
Columbia, HEARNGS, supra note 2, at 554. The Administration proposal makes special
provision for the detention of narcotics addicts. S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969).
adding a new § 3146B: "Pretrial detention for certain persons addicted to narcotics." A
narcotics charge in itself would not be sufficient ground for detention, however, the pro-
vision would merely make detention easier for a defendant charged with a crime of
violence who appeared to be an addict. See S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1969), pro-
posed § 3146B(a).
20. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JusricE, BAIL AND SuaiI.oss 166
(1965).
21. Records relating prior offenses to bail and parole violations are not maintained;
thus the research required to establish such a history would require a great deal of effort.
22. See Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra note 5, at 1505-06; model
statute for preventive detention considered, but not recommended by the Advisory Com-
mittee on Pretrial Proceedings of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, in Standards Relating to Pretrial Release 85 (tentative
draft, 1968). The committee felt, as a practical matter, that on the basis of present predic-
tive techniques too many defendants would be detained and that tie use of restrictive
conditions on release has not been fully explored. Id. at 85-87.
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The elements to be considered in a defendant's criminal history in-
clude the number and seriousness of previous convictions, as well as
their similarity to the offense charged. The seriousness of the de-
fendant's recidivist history required to justify preventive detention
should vary according to the particular offense charged. Some history
of serious lawbreaking would always be required, but a detention
order could issue more easily in offenses which were particularly
dangerous or which showed very high recidivism rates. A less dan-
gerous offense or a lower recidivism rate would demand a more ex-
tensive personal history of serious lawbreaking before detention would
be possible.3
The single most glaring weakness of the congressional proposals is
their failure to require a personal history which would indicate likely
recidivism. Only one bill would require a past conviction; 24 all others
simply rely on the list of personal considerations of the Bail Reform
Act.25 Without the showing of a history of serious lawbreaking, the
imposition of detention would be unreasonable.
Experience under the Bail Reform Act in the District of Columbia
may show why the Congressional proposals have bypassed this require-
ment. Under the provisions of the Act, the judicial officer is expected
to make a significant inquiry into the facts in determining the ap-
propriate pretrial release conditions for an accused person; the de-
fendant's attorney and the prosecutor are expected to play adversary
roles in uncovering relevant facts which would influence the court's
decision. There is, however, a wide gap between theory and practice
in the setting of pretrial release conditions.20 Although the final deci-
sion remains in the magistrate's hands, the actual determination of
the defendant's status seems to be made by the Bail Agency; the Bail
23. Since such a "sliding scale" measure for preventive detention is extremely unlikely
to be forthcoming, the problems with it need only be outlined. Foremost would be the
enormous administrative burden of keeping the macro-statistics for all dangerous offense
categories up to date. Further, the difficulty of obtaining adequate information about a
given defendant would also suggest that such an ideal system is unworkable in the real
world.
24. Senator Byrd's bill, S. 289, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), stipulates that an accused
person cannot be detained without a previous conviction for a crime of violence, ag defined
by the list contained in the bill. See note 19 supra. One conviction would be sufficient,
and the crime with which the defendant is charged need not be related to the crime for
which he was previously convicted, except insofar as they are both "crimes of violence."
Nor is there a time limit for the past conviction; a person convicted of arson in his youth
could be subject to detention 40 years later on a charge of housebreaking.
25. See note 18 supra.
26. Statement of Mrs. Barbara Allen Bowman, Director of the Legal Aid Agency of
the District of Columbia; member, Judicial Council Committee to Study the Bail Reform
Act, HEAmNGs, supra note 2, at 291.
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Agency recommends whatever conditions it deems appropriate after
such hasty investigations as time and resources will allow. In practice
this procedure amounts only to making a telephone call to establish
the presence of community ties.2 7 The judges depend heavily on the
Agency's recommendations; 28 defense attorneys named for indigents
often have little time to investigate their clients' past histories in the
brief period before bail or release conditions are set. Proponents of
preventive detention may feel that an unreasonable amount of re-
sources would be necessary adequately to show a recidivist history.
The prosecuting attorney would be required to search court records
in his and other jurisdictions to establish the requisite pattern of
serious lawbreaking. The administrative burden upon the prosecution
would be sufficiently great to cause grave questions about the fea-
sibility of preventive detention, but this burden clearly must be under-
taken if detention is to be lawful.
II. Procedures for Detention
Even where a defendant fulfills the criteria of "dangerousness," he
must be protected against arbitrary administration of the standards.
The detention hearing and subsequent incarceration must be admin-
istered according to clear rules, to protect the right of due process.
Specific procedural safeguards may be necessary at three stages: the
imposition of detention, judicial review of the detention order, and
the duration of the detention period. Again, proponents of preventive
detention are faced with the problem of the high cost of protecting
rights: the greater the degree of protection afforded the defendant,
the more cumbersome and less desirable the system of preventive de-
tention. Probably for this reason, the proposals before Congress pro-
vide few formal procedural safeguards, despite the insistence in
academic discussions and model statutes that they are required by
the Constitution.
27. Id. at 293-94.
28. Judge Charles AV. Halleck, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions, made
dear this problem of short time and little information. The court, he said, is obliged to
rely in large measure upon fragmentary reports furnished by the District of Columbia
Bail Agency. HEARMNGS, supra note 2, at 99-100. Yet he was quite critical of the Agency,
even while he admitted relying on their recommendations: "[E]ither the Bail Agency
personnel are extremely naive and unrealistic, or else the [Bail Reform] Act requires
release on personal bond of defendants of this [dangerous] type." Id. at 109. Whether a
detention order could constitutionally issue under this procedure seems doubtful.
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The Detention Hearing. The logical forum for the detention deci-
sion is the preliminary examination, at which bail is normally set. If
the judicial officer found that no restrictive release condition would
provide sufficient protection against the dangerous defendant, pre-
ventive detention would be at his disposal, providing the defendant
met the criteria of danger previously outlined. The immediacy and
gravity of a detention order, as opposed to the normal bail-setting
consequences, however, require two alterations in the regular proce-
dure of preliminary examinations where detention is contemplated.
These alterations involve the right to counsel and the right to cross-
examine witnesses. Although a defendant has a right to counsel at the
preliminary examination,2 9 it is not certain that the presence of coun-
sel is mandatory for the setting of bail.80 One of the congressional
proposals provides for the appointment of counsel, but none requires
counsel at the hearing.3' Incarceration is a far graver measure than are
release conditions; since immediate loss of freedom is at stake, the
absence of an attorney at the detention hearing would be as conse-
quential as his absence at the trial itself, and could not be reasonable.
The defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary
hearing is limited in most Circuits. Since immediate detention is at
stake, in addition to the determination of probable cause, denying the
right of cross-examination to the defendant faced with preventive de-
tention would also be of doubtful constitutionality. The Supreme
Court has held that witnesses for the prosecution must submit to
cross-examination when they testify at the preliminary examination
if the transcript of testimony is to be used at trial.32 However, in the
District of Columbia, it has been held that the accused is entitled to
confront and cross-examine all witnesses upon whose testimony
the prosecution relies at the hearing.33 The District of Columbia rule
ought to apply in all Circuits whenever preventive detention is at
issue.
29. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 44, as amended in 1966, gives the
defendant a right to counsel at the preliminary examination. See 3 C. WRuoIT, EDERAL
PRAcriCE AND PROCEMURE §§ 734-736 (1969). But whether counsel's presence is required by
the Constitution has not been decided. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 402-03 (1965).
30. The setting of bail by the United States Commissioner before the arrival of defett-
dant's attorney was not ground for vacation of sentence in Marcella v. United States, 344
F.2d 876, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1016 (1966). See also Moore v.
United States, 260 F. Supp. 315, 317 (E.D. Mo. 1966), aff'd, 376 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1967).
31. See S. 546, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 3146A(c) (1969). See also S. 2600, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. Sec. 2, § 3146A(c)(4) (1969).
32. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
33. Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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In addition to these two changes in ordinary pretrial procedure,
three others have been proposed by sponsors of the two most im-
portant congressional bills for preventive detention.34 The motives
for proposing these further changes are complicated. First, the sensi-
tivity of the detention issue makes the addition of any safeguard for
the defendant a wise political move, even if the safeguard is largely
illusory. Second, and perhaps more important, these changes may ease
administration of preventive detention. Although none of these
changes is required by due process, all may be politically necessary
and administratively 4esirable.
The first of these changes is that preventive detention would be
limited to cases in which it was formally requested by the prosecuting
attorney.3 5 On one side, this provision may be seen as a safeguard for
the defendant against arbitrary detention by an eager magistrate; but
the value of such a safeguard is doubtful. It is extremely unlikely that
a magistrate would seek to impose preventive detention absent a
recommendation from the prosecutor. The requirement of prose-
cutorial initiation can hardly compensate for the absence of adequate
criteria of dangerousness.3
Another feature of the congressional proposals is a separate, quite
formal hearing to be held for decisions on preventive detention.-
Since any procedural elements adopted for this "special evidentiary
hearing" could be imposed on the regular preliminary examination,
such a hearing would not be required to protect due process. A sep-
arate hearing, however, might be desirable from both the defendant's
and the prosecutor's perspectives. The prosecution would have suffi-
cient time to establish its case for detention. s For the defendant
population as a whole, the separate hearing would act as a limitation
on both judicial discretion and prosecutorial fervor in the imposition
34. Senator Tydings, S. 546, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); Senator Hrnska, Representative
McCulloch et aL, sponsoring the Nixon Administration proposal, S. 2600, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. (1969), and H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
35. S. 546, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3146A(a) (1969); S. 2600, H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 3146A(c)(1), (2) (1969). Under the Administration proposal, however, "The judidal
officer may detain for a period not to exceed five calendar days a person who comes before
him for a bail determination charged with any offense, if it appears that such person is
presently on probation, parole, or mandatory release pending completion of sentence for
any offense under State or Federal law and that such person may flee or pose a danger to
any other person or the community if released." S. 2600, H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., Ist Ses.
Sec. 2, § 3146A(e) (1969).
36. See pp. 928-33 supra.
37. S. 546, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 3146A (1969); S. 2600 and H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., Ist
Sess. § 3146A(b)(1) (1969).
38. Cf. note 27 supra.
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of detention; the limited resources of the prosecutor would force him
to bypass marginal cases.
Under the two important bills, testimony given by the accused at
a detention hearing would be inadmissible at trial.30 Under the pres-
ent rules for the preliminary examination, "any statement made by [the
defendant] may be used against him" at trial. 40 The aim of the re-
striction on admissibility dearly is to forestall due process objections;
such a restriction, however, is probably not constitutionally required.
The hearing for probable cause, to which the present rule applies, is
much more likely to elicit incriminating testimony than a hearing for
preventive detention; the testimony relevant to the detention decision
concerns the defendant's past criminal record, rather than his present
crime. Much less than in a hearing for probable cause would the
defendant be torn between incriminating himself and proving his lack
of dangerousness. And the Fifth Amendment safeguard against self-
incrimination would not be waived. The sensitive politics of preven-
tive detention, however, may result in the retention of the provision
to bar use of the hearing testimony at trial.41
39. S. 546, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3146A(d) (1969). The Nixon Administration proposal
is that "Testimony of the [accused] person given during the hearing shall not be admlisi-
ble in proceedings pursuant to sections 3150, 3150A, and 3150B of this title [18 U.S.C.3,
in perjury proceedings, and as impeachment in any subsequent proceedings." S. 2600 and
H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3146A(c)(6) (1969). And, under the Nixon proposal, "In-
formation stated in, or offered in connection with, any order entered pursuant to this
section need not conform to the rules pertaining to the admissability of evidence In a
court of law." Id. at § 3146A(c)(5).
40. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5(b). The testimony of witnesses at the
preliminary hearing "can be introduced to impeach the accused's witnesses at trial." Note,
The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IowA L. REv. 164, 171 (1965). See
also R. MOLEY, OUR CRIMINAL Cours 24 (1930).
Further, "[h]earsay evidence is considered, leading questions are permitted, and insufli-
dent opportunity is given for cross-examination." Id. at 32. Cf. People v. Johns, 173 Cal.
App. 2d 38, 343 P.2d 92 (1959); People v. Woolsey, 13 Cal. App. 2d 54, 56 P.2d 557 (1936),
Bergen v. State, 234 Md. 394, 199 A.2d 381 (1964). Strict rules of evidence do not apply
at the preliminary hearing. See, e.g., State v. Earley, 192 Kan. 167, 386 P.2d 189 (W6.3).
But for a limit to this doctrine, possibly heralding a stricter rule, see Washington v.
Clemmer, 339 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Since it is the defendant's past behavior that Is
at issue for preventive detention, however, the due process measure of rules of evidence
probably ought to be the same as for the ordinary determination of probable cause.
41. One other procedural aspect of preventive detention which might be subject to a
due process challenge is the identity of the judicial officer who makes the decision whether
or not to detain. "All federal judges, and a great variety of state officers, are authorized to
commit persons for federal offenses, 18 U.S.C.A. § 8041, . . . but in practice the United
States magistrates are almost always used." 1 C. WRiosrr, Fm.AAL PRAarMcE AND PRoCrEDUax
§ 71, n.2 (1969). A defendant may be committed to custody at the preliminary examination
by "any justice or judge of the United States, or by any United States magistrate, or by
any chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first judge of common pleas,
mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other magistrate, of any state where the offender
may be found .. " 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (1964). It may be argued that, because preventive
detention involves such a major decision-depriving the defendant of the right to ball-a
fully qualified federal judge ought to decide the question; a justice of the peace, for
example, may be felt to be of too slight judicial stature to make such a grave decision,
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The threat of invoking preventive detention would undoubtedly
strengthen the prosecutor's hand in a plea-bargaining situation, espe-
cially in the case of a defendant who could meet ordinary release
conditions. An elaborate procedure for imposing detention would,
from a system-wide perspective, reduce the occurrence of detention
orders. Yet the mere existence of the power as a prosecutorial tool
would be a powerful incentive for a guilty plea by a defendant facing
the risk of months of pre-trial incarceration.
Appeal of the Detention Order. A defendant detained for dangerous-
ness would have a right to appeal the detention order, just as a defen-
dant now may appeal the setting of bail.4 The state would be required
to bear the expense of producing a transcript of the preventive de-
tention hearing for indigent defendants, under Griffin v. Illinois.43 A
more serious cost would be the considerable resources necessary to
hear the appeal. A federal judge, rather than a magistrate, would be
required; in Washington, D.C., a system "which has literally collapsed
under its caseload," -14 the wisdom of imposing this additional burden
is highly questionable.
All appeals must be entertained except those which are clearly
frivolous.45 The complicated criteria necessary to impose preventive
detention will ensure that few of these appeals can be disposed of
as frivolous. Thus considerable time and resources will be spent in
providing for the defendant to go up and down the court system;
such costs have caused the federal system assiduously to avoid a regular
right of interlocutory appeal. Again, due process restrictions may be
This contention, while perhaps desirable from a practical viewpoint, has little constitu-
tional basis; since this spectrum of judicial officers is deemed qualified to make the
probable cause decision, it seems likely that any one of these designated officers could
make all decisions appurtenant to pretrial disposition, including the decision to detain.
42. 18 U.S.C. § 8147. Several bills make explicit provision for appellate review of the
detention order. S. 546, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 3146A(f) (1969); S. 260 and H.R. 12806, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 2, § 3146A(d)(7) (1969). If a statute for preventive detention were
construed to deny appellate review, it would be a denial of equal protection to the detainee
class; and the grave consequences of a detention order suggest that the due process
guarantee would also be violated. The silence of most of the proposals for preventive
detention on the point of appellate review probably cannot be taken as a denial of the
right.
43. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
44. Statement of Mrs. Barbara B. Bowman, Legal Aid Society for the District of
Columbia; Member, Judicial Council Committee to Study the Bail Reform Act, HEAMNixs,
supra note 2, at 293.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106; cf. Moulas v. The s/s Markab, 252 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1958);
Jimenez v. Barber, 252 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1958); Wilson v. Dixon, 251 F.2d 338 (9th Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 856 (1958). See also Rule 38, F DnEMat. Ruz.rs oF ArpmzL,
PRocEDuRE (1967); Rule 46a(2), FrE-aAL RUL.s oF CusNuNAL. PRoenu..
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so great as to give the court system a greater burden than the expected
benefits of preventive detention justify.
Duration of Detention. Court dockets at present are notoriously
crowded, especially in the District of Columbia; the time between
arrest and trial is inordinately long.40 This situation presents a difficult
question for proponents of preventive detention: even if detention
is imposed under adequately rigid criteria of dangerousness, must
there be a limit on the detention period? A defendant may argue
that an "excessive" detention period is a violation of due process.
One natural limit on the detention period is the maximum sentence
which the detainee might receive for the charged offense; but since
preventive detention must be limited to serious offenses, which gen.
erally carry lengthy maximum sentences for repeating offenders, in
practice this standard would offer virtually no protection.
Defendants who are "preventively" detained should not be subject
to the administrative vicissitudes of the criminal court system; the
seriousness of detention ought to require a stricter standard than mere
administrative convenience to ensure that incarceration is held to the
minimum feasible period. Several congressional proponents of preven-
tive detention have responded adequately to this problem by setting
firm time limits on detention, ranging from 30 to 60 days.47 A defen-.
46. "The average time between indictment and final disposition of all criminal cases
terminated in December, 1968 [in the District of Columbia] was 162 days or almost five
and one half months. In the other months of 1968 it was longer." Statement of Ion,
Edward M. Curran, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, lEARINGS,
supra note 2, at 338. However, the length of time between indictment and trial in felony
cases is a good deal longer; in the District of Columbia in 1968, it took "almost a year
to bring a felony defendant to trial." Statement of Mrs. Patricia M. Wald, Washiugton,
D.C., attorney; member, Judicial Council Committee to Study the Bail Reform Act; Com-
missioner, President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia, HEARINGS, szipra
note 2, at 138.
47. Senator Tydings' bill is the only proposal providing a 30-day limit. S. 546, 91st
Cong., Ist Sess., § 3146A(e) (1969). Bills providing 60-day limits include S. 2600 and
H.R. 12806, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 2, § 3146A(d)(1)(A) (1969); H.R. 323, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., § 3146(c)(2)(c) (1969); H.R. 2781, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 3146(c)(2)(c) (1969).
If "dangerous" defendants were brought to trial 60 days after arrest, the need for
preventive detention would be greatly reduced. In the District of Columbia, half of the
pretrial recidivist offenses occur more than 60 days after a defendant is indicted. Report
of the Judicial Council Committee to Study the Operation of the Bail Reform Act in the
District of Columbia, HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 555. Further, the psychological effect of a
delayed trial on a released defendant promotes recidivism; if the trial were to occur withi
60 days, the defendant would feel a greater impetus to "stay clean." Statement of Patricia
M. Wald, HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 141. See also Statement of Hon. Charles S. Halleck,
Judge of the District of Columbia Court of General Session, HEAIUNGS, supra note 2, at 92,
Chief Judge Harold H. Greene of the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions has
argued that any large-scale project to speed up trials for crimes of violence would be
"at best a desperate stopgap," with the result that "non-violent crimes would be tried only
after even longer periods of delay than exist at present." Statement of Chief Judge Greene,
HEARINGS, supra note 2, at 35. But the effect of such a program would not be so disruptive
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dant would then be released, unless his trial had begun or unless
the defendant himself had caused the delay of the trial.48 These limits
appear to strike a reasonable balance between the need to protect the
community, the interest in defendants' freedom, and the capacity
of the system of criminal justice to process a "dangerous" defendant
rapidly.
4 9
Several of the measures before Congress take the position that a time
limit on detention is the only safeguard for the defendant demanded
by due process; a 60-day limit is accompanied by few other formal
safeguards. 50 While a time limit is necessary and important, it is not
a substitute for a means of identifying dangerous defendants. The
clearly defined criteria for dangerousness previously discussed must
also be met for preventive detention to survive constitutional attack.
The goal of preventive detention, to guard the community against
dangerous pretrial recidivism, could be reached by other, less contro-
versial methods. A program of speedy trials would eliminate most of
these crimes.51 A comprehensive bail agency, 52 effectively using condi-
if the unusually expedited trials were limited to the relatively small number of dangerous
defendants at which preventive detention is aimed.
48. See, e.g., S. 546, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 3146A(h) (1969); S. 2600 and H.R. 12806, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 2, § 3146A(d)(2)(A) (1969).
49. Several proposals carry provisions for an "expedited trial calendar," in which the
cases of defendants "preventively detained" would be heard on an accelerated schedule.
S. 546, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 3146A(h) (1969); S. 2600 and H.R. 12806, 91st Cong.. 1st Sess.,
Sec. 2, § 3146A(d)(1) (1969); H.R. 323, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 3146(b)(a)(B) (1969). These
provisions, admirably designed to limit the detention period, may cause some unforeseen
difficulties. The provisions are notably vague; there is no standard for expedition, except
for the convenience of the court. In practice, this vagueness may result in virtually no
expedition at all. Further difficulty may arise out of the demand, however vague, that
some expedition be granted. An astute defense attorney might later claim a due process
violation on the grounds that the "expedited trial calendar" provision was violated; that is,
the defendant was held too long before trial in view of the demand for an accelerated
schedule. Unwanted additional administrative costs would clearly ensue in handling claims
under this undefined standard.
50. H.R. 323, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.RL 2781, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); H.R.
4189, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The limited detention period might cause a further
procedural tangle where the defendant sought to appeal the detention order. A laggard
appellate court would cause the defendant to serve his detention period before an appeal
was heard; a contentious defendant might charge a violation of due process on the basis
of this statutorily granted, but administratively denied appeal.
It is unlikely that a defendant would have a right to pursue his appeal of a detention
order once the detention period has elapsed. The federal rule is that a point is not moot
if legal disabilities attach to the judgment. See Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (16S); cf.
Parker v. Ellis, 362 US. 574 (1960); United States v. National Plastikwear Fashions, Inc.,
368 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1966). A defendant could, of course, claim that to be branded
"dangerous" is a stigma of such dimensions as to amount to a legal disability, however.
the Supreme Court has held that "the moral stigma of a judgment which no longer
affects legal rights does not present a case or controversy for appellate review." St. Pierre
v. United States, 319 US. 41, 43 (1943).
51. See note 47 supra.
52. See Statement of Mrs. Barbara B. Bowman, Legal Aid Agency for the District of
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tional release methods,5 3 could maintain substantial control over the
activities of the dangerous defendant," especially if his trial were
scheduled for the immediate future. Compared with preventive de-
tention, the costs of such a program, in both money and human
suffering, would be low. But because such a program would be less
attractive politically, Congress is likely to choose preventive detention.
The practical problems of preventive detention will be numerous
and complicated. Most of the proposals before Congress provide in-
adequate safeguards for the rights of the defendant and are clearly
unconstitutional. Other proposals, for administrative reasons, go be-
yond the demands of due process in limited areas, for example in pro-
viding for a separate detention hearing; yet even these proposals are
inadequate in failing to establish minimum standards of dangerous-
ness.
Congress, if it chooses the course of preventive detention, may well
be caught on the horns of an irresolvable dilemma. A constitutional
program of preventive detention will be unworkable in the real world
unless enormous resources are devoted to its operation. If, however,
these new resources for criminal justice are available, they could more
effectively attack the problem by being dedicated to expansion and
improvement of the present means of pretrial surveillance and to an
increase in criminal court personnel.
Columbia, HEAINGS, supra note 2, at 291, 301; Statement of Mrs. Patricia M. Wald, id.
at 127, 146.
53. See Statement of Hon. Charles W. Halleck, Judge, District of Columbia Court of
General Sessions, HEAIUNGS, supra note 2, at 91, 101-102. "In short, while the [Ball Reform]
act contemplates that Judges will go to great lengths to establish a variety of condlitions
of release other than money bail, the act provides no method of enforcement and no
penalty for violation of such conditions of release." Id. at 102.
54. "The court should, in the future, set release conditions which will effectively protect
the community from the commission of offenses by persons on bail." Statement of Chief
Judge Harold H. Greene, District of Columbia Court of General Sessions.
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